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Abstract. All significant construction projects involve the project owner and the contractor, as well as their project man-
agers. Following upon recent research into the multiple principal-agent problem, which was applied to the minimization 
of communication risk in construction projects, the focus here is on communication issues between the four project par-
ties. Recent research has shown that the relationship between the project owner and the contractor is paramount for risk 
minimization before the contract between them is signed. However, the relationship between project managers is domi-
nant for risk minimization after the contract is signed. To further explore risk minimization at this stage of the project, 
the Delphi method was employed. A panel of highly-experienced project managers working for both project owners and 
contractors was asked several rounds of questions in an attempt to arrive to a consensus concerning the most important 
relationships between project parties in terms of risk minimization after the contract is signed. The relationship between 
the two project managers tops the ranking, thus focusing further research. As they are both agents, and as there is no 
contract between them, this offers a fresh challenge for the principal-agent theory.
Keywords: principal-agent theory, communication risk, construction projects, project management, Delphi method.
Introduction
Good communication between key participants is essential 
for the success of every construction project (Zavadskas 
et al. 2010). Poor communication is one of the most 
common project risks (Ceric 2003). Communication in-
volves sharing relevant information between project par-
ticipants. It is commonly assumed that all participants 
cooperate and exchange information in order to achieve 
project’s goals. However, there is a potential conflict of 
interests between project participants because they all 
have their own interests, as well (Park et al. 2010).
The situation in which one of the two parties is bet-
ter informed than the other is well known in econom-
ics as the principal-agent problem (e.g. Jäger 2008). The 
principal-agent problem deals with the design of contract 
with respect to asymmetric information (Huang, Hsueh 
2010). In construction projects, the project owner and 
contractor as principal and agent form the key relation-
ship (Turner, Müller 2004). Delegation of tasks estab-
lishes a principal-agent relationship between the project 
owner and manager, where the principal (project owner) 
depends on the agent (contractor or project manager) to 
undertake a task on the principal’s behalf (Müller, Turner 
2005). One can act on assumption that an agent will try 
to maximize his or her own benefit even when that may 
involve a higher damage to the client (Schieg 2008). 
According to the principal-agent theory, this problem is 
characterized by three issues concerning the relationship 
between the principal and the agent: adverse selection, 
moral hazard, and hold-up. These three issues will be 
discussed in the next section. 
The literature review shows that the application of 
the principal-agent problem in construction is extensive. 
It covers all three issues of risk concerning the relation-
ship between the principal and agent: adverse selection, 
moral hazard, and hold-up. Analyzing papers that have 
been published so far, it can be concluded that most au-
thors have researched moral hazard dealing with supply 
chain management, procurement systems, make-or-buy 
decisions, and outsourcing (Rosenfeld, Geltner 1991; 
Tadelis 2002; Yiu et al. 2002; Ive, Chang 2007). Some 
authors have discussed the adverse selection problem and 
its impact on building performance and building quality 
(Holt et al. 1995; Corvellec, Macheridis 2010). It should 
be noted that the hold-up problem dealing with sub- 
contracting and procurement systems has attracted least 
attention so far (Chang, Ive 2007; Unsal, Taylor 2010). 
However, the literature does not cover the relationship 
between project managers in construction projects, which 
is at the core of the research presented in this paper.
The research presented here was conducted in two 
phases. In the first phase, an exploratory survey of 
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project managers with considerable experience was used 
to establish the relative importance of communication 
risk sources and types of relationship in construction 
projects. Since this research is exploratory in nature, a 
questionnaire survey was considered an appropriate tool. 
The objective was to establish an understanding of the 
relative importance of a number of communication risks 
established in the literature. The respondents were pro-
ject managers with considerable experience and expertise 
in the field. They were selected for this study because 
they play central roles in all construction projects. Their 
perceptions of communication risks are thus important. 
However, the survey respondents cannot be said to be 
representative of all project managers, the population of 
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Out of thirty-five construction project managers ap-
proached, twenty-seven participated in the survey (re-
sponse rate: 75 percent). Several of them were involved 
in an initial pilot survey to ensure its comprehensibility. 
On the average, the respondents had fifteen years of ex-
perience on a wide variety of construction projects. The 
largest projects they had managed had an average value 
of $1 billion. Many of the largest projects were in infra-
structure, but all other types of projects were represent-
ed. Collectively, the respondents worked on construction 
projects in a wide range of countries on most continents. 
The respondents were asked to offer their perceptions, 
and they felt comfortable expressing them. The survey 
took two weeks.
The focus was placed on project managers because 
they are most intimate with the construction process 
itself. It was found that the relationship between the 
project owner and contractor is the most important be-
fore the contract is signed between them. It should be 
pointed out that this finding suggests that there was no 
bias among the respondents. It was also found that, after 
the contract is signed between the project owner and 
contractor, the most important relationship for risk min-
imization in the process of monitoring is that between 
the project owner’s and contractor’s project managers.
In the second phase, the Delphi method was used to 
investigate this important finding in greater detail. This 
method can be valuable for developing theory (Okoli, 
Pawlowski 2004). The focus was placed on the monitor-
ing process itself, which is central to risk minimization 
during construction. 
In the pages that follow, asymmetric information 
and communication risk are first introduced. Next, the 
principal-agent theory framework in construction 
projects is presented. Special emphasis is placed on the 
communication risk in connection with asymmetric in-
formation. Then the research method is discussed. The 
results of the Delphi survey are presented in two sec-
tions: first, the respondents’ perceptions of risk mini-
mization are discussed; second, the main findings are 
presented. Then the limitations of the study are briefly 
discussed. The paper closes with conclusions including 
ideas for future research.
1. Asymmetric information and  
communication risk 
There is a large literature on asymmetric information and 
its applications. Only a few sources will be used in this 
section for explanatory purposes. In particular, the pres-
entation relies on Jäger (2008) and Schieg (2008). 
Asymmetric information occurs whenever the princi-
pal and the agent are not in possession of the same infor-
mation at the same time. In construction projects, there are 
four key parties who work together: the project owner, the 
contractor, and their project managers. It is customarily as-
sumed that they will share important information in order 
to meet the main project targets: time, cost, and quality. 
However, because of self-interest, the four parties will not 
be willing to share all the information all of the time. The 
following types of information asymmetry apply in cases 
like this one: hidden characteristics, hidden information, 
and hidden intention. Respectively, these three types of in-
formation asymmetry generate the following risks: adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and hold-up. 
Adverse selection describes information asymmetries 
when the principal does not have the exact qualifications 
of the agent. It occurs before the contract is signed and 
the result can be the wrong choice of the contractual part-
ner. In the case of moral hazard there are information 
asymmetries after the contract is signed. The principal 
cannot control all the agent’s activities and an informa-
tion imbalance in favour of the agent can thus occur. If 
the agent uses this situation opportunistically, then this 
type of asymmetric information is called moral hazard. 
If the principal makes large investments in money or oth-
er resources because of the trusty relationship with the 
agent, and if these investments come into jeopardy in the 
case the agent acts uncooperatively, the resulting problem 
is called hold-up. The principal has already made an irre-
versible investment and this enables the agent to confront 
him with excessive demands, for instance.
1.1. Construction projects
Based on the principal-agent theory, the relationships be-
tween the project owner, the contractor, and their project 
managers are systemized according to the related types 
of asymmetric information and the corresponding types 
of risk. Again, hidden characteristics are associated with 
adverse selection; hidden action and/or hidden informa-
tion are associated with moral hazard; and hidden inten-
tions are associated with hold-up.
Hidden characteristics cause the adverse selection 
problem before contracts are signed between the parties 
involved. The most important among them is the contract 
between the project owner and the contractor. Choosing 
the proper contractor is a complicated problem for clients 
(Zavadskas et al. 2010). Adverse selection means that 
the project owner does not have all the information about the 
contractor before the contractor is hired. Similarly, the 
project owner does not have all the information about 
the project manager before hiring. The same holds for 
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the contractor and the project manager hired. The ad-
verse selection problem occurs in the early phases of the 
project. Generally, these phases are important from the 
point of view of risk. The early phases of a project are of 
particular interest because the level of influence on total 
project costs is highest early on; also, the impact of early 
decisions on total project costs is the highest (Hendrickson, 
Au 1989). The potential influence of stake-holders is 
also highest in the early project phases, before a detailed 
agenda is set and the cost for making changes is rela-
tively low (Kolltveit, Grønhaug 2004).
Hidden information or hidden action causes the mor-
al hazard risk. This occurs after contracts are signed be-
tween the parties involved. Again, the contract between 
the project owner and the contractor is the most important 
among them. Moral hazard means that the client cannot 
be sure that the companies, once hired, will fully mobi-
lize their capabilities on the client’s behalf or on behalf 
of other clients of theirs (Winch 2002). In our case, four 
parties are potentially involved in the moral hazard prob-
lem. After the contract is signed and the project owner 
has hired the contractor, as well as after the project owner 
and the contractor have hired their project managers, they 
cannot be sure that all the relevant information will be 
shared in an appropriate way because of their self-interest. 
People will not act in the interest of others, their princi-
pals or partners, to the exclusion of their own preferences 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen 2000). The moral hazard prob-
lem also occurs between two project managers because 
they have their own self-interest, as well.
Hidden intentions can cause hold-up problems. The 
project owner can invest resources at any stage of the 
project in trust that the contractor will cooperate, but it 
can happen that the contractor will act opportunistically. 
Once the project owner realizes that the contractor is be-
having opportunistically, it can be too late for the project 
owner to withdraw the resources already invested.
1.2. Risk minimization
There are several ways to minimize risks that arise from 
adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold-up problems. 
These are screening and monitoring.  The former is rel-
evant before the contract is signed, whereas the latter 
is relevant after signing. The purpose of screening is to 
gather information of use to the principal in an effort to 
learn more about the agent’s qualifications – for instance, 
references, certificates, work probes, and credit worthi-
ness. Similarly, the purpose of monitoring is to ascertain 
that the agent is behaving in accordance with the con-
tract. As both of these are costs, they are known in the 
literature as “agency costs”.
2. Principal-agent theory framework  
for construction projects 
The owner of a project is the person or group who pro-
vides the financial resources for its delivery, accepts 
the project milestones, and project completion (Project 
Management Institute 2009). The project owner hires a 
contractor to perform all the activities required to com-
plete the project (Fig. 1).
Both the project owner and contractor in any ma-
jor project are represented by their project managers, to 
whom many of their tasks are delegated. Together, they 
can be considered the four key parties to every major 
project (Fig. 2).
3. Research method 
At any one time, project managers are geographically 
spread apart, as well as not available for consultation 
over lengthy periods of time. Therefore, the Delphi 
method was chosen as an appropriate approach to sur-
vey their opinion. The Delphi method is a method for 
obtaining and processing judgmental data. It consists of 
a sequenced program of interrogation in session or by 
mail (Brauers 2008, 2012). The Delphi method was in-
troduced by the Rand Corporation in the 1950s with the 
objective of obtaining the most reliable consensus from 
a group of experts. It is especially effective in difficult 
areas that can benefit from subjective judgements on a 
collective basis (Lindeman 1975). A panel of ten to fif-
teen experts has proved to be a good guideline (Delbecq 
et al. 1975). The consensus is reached through structured 
communication involving feedback over several itera-
tions (Linstone, Turoff 1975). At each iteration, each re-
spondent can see the responses to the previous iterations 
of all other respondents without knowing who they are. 
It makes it possible for experts to change their previous 
assessments in the light of new information provided by 
their peers (Chan et al. 2001). The objective of these 
iterations is to achieve the desired level of consensus 
among panellists, for which measures of central tendency 
and level of dispersion are typically used to present the col-
lective judgement of respondents (see, e.g. Hsu, Sandford 
2007). The method is especially suitable when time and 
cost constraints make frequent face-to-face meetings dif-
ficult to arrange (Ericsson, Henricsson 2005).
Fig. 2. Principal-agent theory framework for construction 
projects (PO: Project owner, C: Contractor, PMpo: Project 
owner’s project manager, PMc: Contractor’s project manager)
Fig. 1. Project owner-contractor relationship (PO: Project 
Owner, C: Contractor)
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One of the standard problems with the application of 
the Delphi method is the selection of the experts (Sharkey, 
Sharples 2001; Yousuf 2007; Hsu, Sandford, 2007). This 
is especially important when it is not possible to ascer-
tain the degree to which the selection is representative of 
the population in question. In this research, three criteria 
were used to select the project managers for the study:
1. Level of experience as measured by the years in-
volved in the field;
2. Size of the largest project managed in terms of its 
monetary value; and
3. Involvement in a variety of projects as measured by 
the number of countries covered.
Collectively, the respondents worked on construction 
projects in a wide range of countries on most continents. 
Among more than thirty countries, they worked in Egypt, 
Hong Kong, India, Iraq, Italy, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. They can therefore be 
understood as experts in the field.
There were two Delphi rounds in the research re-
ported here. For the first round, 20 respondents were se-
lected by sharpening the above criteria for the purposes 
of the Delphi method. Given the focus on risk minimi-
zation in the construction phase, the project managers 
with greatest experience in the field were selected. All 
of them were practitioners with considerable expertise, 
as witnessed by their thirteen years of experience on 
the average, and the average of the largest project they 
managed assessed at $1.4 billion, of which the latter 
was considered more important than the former. Also, 
they had considerable international experience. Collec-
tively, they had worked on all continents. In the first 
round, 15 out of 20 selected respondents participated 
(response rate: 75 percent). The first round took one 
week.
In the second and final Delphi round, 11 out of 15 
respondents took part (response rate: 73 percent). Also, 
7 out of 15 respondents, or 47 percent, chose to modify 
their scores in view of the results of the first Delphi round. 
The second round took one week. Survey questions for 
two Delphi rounds can be found in Appendices A and B.
The scale used here is ostensibly ordinal, and ordi-
nal data do not permit statistical analysis using means 
and standard deviations, but only medians and ranges in-
stead (Stevens 1946). However, the scale used here can 
be meaningfully interpreted as the interval scale, as it 
involves only levels of importance, from least to most 
important. Each level of importance can be interpreted as 
the same as any other, and the scale can thus be interpret-
ed as linear. In such a case, especially if the scale is suf-
ficiently wide, it is permissible to treat the ordinal scale 
as an interval one (Knapp 1990). Therefore, means and 
standard deviations can be used in the statistical analysis 
applied to the interpretation of the data.
Given that one of the fundamental goals of the Del-
phi method is the achievement of a satisfactory consen-
sus between panel experts, it is necessary to conduct a 
quantitative analysis of the consensus by means of a non-
parametric statistical test.
One of the metrics that is widely recognized as the 
best is Kendall’s coefficient of concordance, W (Okoli, 
Pawlowski 2004). Kendall’s W takes on values between 
zero and one (Kendall, Gibbons 1990). The value of zero 
means that that there is no agreement between the ex-
perts, meaning that the achieved consensus is a matter of 
chance. The value of one represents full agreement be-
tween the experts, meaning that all of them have provided 
identical answers. Schmidt (1997) proposes that Kendal’s 
W offers the best measure of agreement in the applica-
tion of the Delphi method. According to him, W = 0.5 
represents moderate agreement and a fair confidence in 
rankings, whereas W = 0.7 represents strong agreement 
and high confidence in rankings.
From the point of view of risk minimization, monitor-
ing is the key project-management activity after the con-
tract between the project owner and contractor is signed. 
This suggests that the relationship between the project 
owner’s and contractor’s project managers is therefore 
the key relationship at this stage of the project.
4. Risk minimization: respondents’ perceptions 
Before moving to the main findings, the results will be pre-
sented starting with the last section of the survey, in which 
the respondents were asked to list specific communication 
risks between the project parties, as well as to list most ap-
propriate risk-minimization approaches in each case. The 
most important responses are presented in this section so as 
to give substance to the argument that follows. The major-
ity of pertinent responses concerns the relationship between 
the project owner and contractor, on the one hand, and the 
project owner’s and contractor’s project managers, on the 
other. The latter relationship deserves special attention, as 
will be argued in the next section. So far, this relationship 
has not received sufficient notice from the research com-
munity concerned with the construction field.
Referring to communication in general, three re-
spondents argue that all the relationships addressed in 
this survey would be much improved by “regular meet-
ings” and “regular reporting”, as well as a “greater flow 
of information” between project parties. As another re-
spondent points out, the main message to project parties 
is that they should “communicate properly”. These are 
important pointers for future research.
4.1. Project owner-contractor 
This is the relationship between the principal and 
the agent. It is central to the principal-agent theory. 
However, the project managers surveyed have many 
critical comments about this relationship. According to 
one respondent, there is “no direct communication be-
tween the project owner and contractor because project 
managers act as buffers between parties; an appropriate 
communication protocol must be set up”.  Another respondent 
suggests that “all critical issues should be openly discussed 
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without hidden agendas due to the very complex nature 
of the construction process”. Yet another states that “the 
highest risk is the inability of the owner to clearly explain 
what is expected from the contractor – unclear scope defi-
nition, vague expectations, etc”. Two respondents mention 
“incomplete progress reports” and “incomplete contract 
and design documents” as special problems. What is need-
ed, according to one respondent, is “clear and consistent 
change-management from the project owner’s side”. An-
other points out that “there is almost no communication 
between the project owner and the contractor once the con-
tract is signed”. Yet another respondent argues that “the 
most important thing is to prepare detailed and understand-
able contracts”. One respondent points out that both par-
ties to the contract “should assess the previous experiences, 
financial ability, and capacity of the opposite side”.
4.2. Project owner-project owner’s project manager 
This is the relationship between the principal and an 
agent hired by the principal to monitor another agent, the 
contractor. Again, the project managers surveyed report 
a number of problems regarding this relationship. One 
respondent states that there is a “lack of on-time reports”. 
Another points out that “clear definitions of responsibili-
ties” are needed. According to one respondent, it is es-
sential that the project owner “clearly explains the goals 
of the project to its project manager in order to avoid 
confusions”. Another states that “the project owner may 
fail to define the company’s strategy to its project man-
ager”. One respondent mentions “unclear targets, some-
times close to “hidden agendas”, from the project own-
er’s side”. Another states that “on-time updates regarding 
decisions by the project owner” are necessary. According 
to yet another respondent, “a long-term relationship be-
tween the project owner and its project manager should 
be preferred to better understand each other”.
4.3. Contractor-contractor’s project manager 
In this case, the contractor acts as the principal in relation 
to the agent directly involved in a project. The relation-
ship has its own difficulties. One respondent argues that 
“the project manager should be assigned from the core of 
organization, so that he/she would be in position to make 
better assessment concerning possible conflicts and guide 
the higher management”. Another states that “the con-
tractor’s project manager cannot be successful without 
higher management support”. According to one respond-
ent, there is “a need for a well-established reporting sys-
tem and regular site visits to ensure that the contractor’s 
project manager is acting properly”. Yet another respond-
ent points out that “the contractor should have follow-up 
and reporting mechanisms, so as to avoid problems”.
4.4. Project owner’s project manager-contractor’s 
project manager
The two agents, one working for the principal and an-
other for the contractor as an agent, are in most direct 
relationship during a construction project, and especially 
in its monitoring phase. Most project managers surveyed 
consider this relationship crucial during construction it-
self. Six respondents state that “this relationship is the 
most important” after the contract is signed. According 
to one of them, “project owners and contractors usually 
have more than one project, so it is most important for 
their project managers to work together”. Another re-
spondent argues that “this relationship is the most sub-
jective one”. “Informal information flow” between the 
two project managers is stressed by yet another respond-
ent. One respondent points out that “most projects fail on 
the personal level”. According to one respondent, “the 
social relationship should extend outside of the project – 
i.e. by means of their families”. “Some social activities, 
such as company banquets, may be helpful in providing 
an informal atmosphere”, states one respondent. Another 
one suggests that “both project managers should have 
the same level of authority; if this is not the case, the 
decision-making process can be negatively affected”. Ac-
cording to yet another respondent, “the main risk is that 
the project owner asks for improvements regarding the 
project that he assumes are included in the project, but 
the contractor assumes that they should be paid for on 
top of the project”.
5. Main findings 
The exploratory survey concerned the relationships be-
tween pairs of four key project participants (Ceric 2012). 
It focused on the relationships in the upper part of the 
diagram shown in Figure 2. The means and standard 
deviations are used mainly as indicators of the relative 
importance of various relationships studied. The relative 
importance of these pairs in risk minimization after the 
contract is signed is shown below (Table 1).
In particular, the relationship between the two pro-
ject managers was considered by the respondents to the 
exploratory survey to be most important for risk mini-
mization. The results shown in the table below are those 
for the twenty practitioners of project management se-
lected for further research. Throughout, the scale from 
1 to 9 (where 9 is most important) is used to rate the 
importance of each relationship between project parties 
in terms of the communication risk involved.
Table 1. The exploratory survey 
Rank Relationship Mean St. Dev.
1 Project owner’s project manager → Contractor’s project manager 7.70 1.66
2 Project owner → Contractor 7.30 1.63
3 Project owner → Project owner’s project manager 6.90 1.65
4 Contractor → Contractor’s project manager 6.74 1.66
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Round one of the Delphi method considers all rela-
tionships shown by arrows in Figure 2 (Table 2). 
Several results are noteworthy. First, the relation-
ship between the contractor’s project manager and pro-
ject owner’s project manager come on top (8.39). The 
reverse relationship is not far behind (8.00), but it is also 
characterised by a relatively high standard deviation 
(1.96 as compared to 0.74 for the previous relationship). 
Second, the relationship between the project owner and 
project owner’s project manager comes next in terms of 
risk minimization during the construction phase (7.07). 
The reverse relationship is some way behind in terms 
of relative importance (6.61). Third, it should be noted 
that the same score applies to the relationship between 
the contractor and project owner, but the standard de-
viation is considerably higher in the latter case (2.08 as 
compared to 1.30). The relationship between the pro-
ject owner and contractor is close behind (6.57), but the 
standard deviation is even higher in this case (2.21). It 
is important to note that standard deviations are highest 
in the case of the relationship between the project owner 
and contractor, as well as that between the contractor and 
project owner (2.21 and 2.08). In other words, the disa-
greement between respondents is the highest in these two 
cases. Fourth, the relationship between the contractor and 
contractor’s project manager, as well as the reverse rela-
tionship, come last in terms of importance in risk mini-
mization (6.43 and 6.39). In these two cases, standard 
deviations are relatively low (1.22 and 1.27), thus sug-
gesting relatively strong agreement between respondents.
Following the first Delphi round conducted in the 
research presented here, the obtained concordance coeffi-
cient W = 0.319 with the level of significance α ∙ < 0.0001. 
This represents a weak agreement between the experts, 
which necessitates another Delphi round.
Round Two of the Delphi method provides a wide 
range of mean scores (6.36–8.57), as well as a narrow 
range of standard deviations (0.63–1.18), which shows 
that a reasonable consensus between the respondents has 
been achieved (Table 3).
A number of important results follow. First, the re-
lationship between the two project managers comes on 
top in terms of the scores. The means are considerably 
higher and standard deviations considerably lower than 
those concerning all other relationships between the key 
project partners. Although the relationship between the 
project owner’s project manager and the contractor’s pro-
ject manager comes on top (8.57), the reverse relation-
ship is not far behind (8.46). It can be concluded that 
both relationships are similar in terms of their importance 
in risk minimization in the construction phase of a pro-
ject. Second, the relationship between the project owner 
and project owner’s project manager comes next in terms 
of importance (7.07). However, the reverse relationship 
is considerably less important according to the respond-
ents (6.61). A strong asymmetry can be noted here by 
comparison with all the other relationships considered in 
this research. Third, the relationship between the project 
owner and contractor, as well as the reverse relationship, 
come next in terms of importance in risk minimization 
(6.79 and 6.71). The scores suggest that these two rela-
tionships are of similar importance to project success. 
Fourth, the relationship between the contractor and con-
tractor’s project manager are considered by the respond-
ents to be least important (6.57 and 6.36). Again, these 
relationships are quite similar in terms of their relative 
importance.
Following the second Delphi round, the obtained 
concordance coefficient W = 0.430 with the level of sig-
nificance α ∙ < 0.0001. The Kendall’s coefficient of con-
cordance has increased by 35 percent, which shows that 
the agreement between the experts has also increased 
by the same percentage. Since the achieved value of W 
is considerably smaller than 0.7, it is necessary to con-
sider the need for the third Delphi round. The analysis 
was performed by using the non-parametric Spearman’s 
Table 2. Delphi round one
Rank Relationship Mean St. Dev.
1 Contractor’s project manager → Project owner’s project manager 8.39 0.74
2 Project owner’s project manager → Contractor’s project manager 8.00 1.96
3 Project owner → Project owner’s project manager 7.07 1.14
4 Project owner’s project manager → Project owner 6.61 1.30
5 Contractor → Project owner 6.61 2.08
6 Project owner → Contractor 6.57 2.21
7 Contractor → Contractor’s project manager 6.43 1.22
8 Contractor’s project manager → Contractor 6.39 1.27
Table 3. Delphi round two
Rank Relationship Mean St. Dev.
1 Project owner’s project manager → Contractor’s project manager 8.57 0.65
2 Contractor’s project manager → Project owner’s project manager 8.46 0.63
3 Project owner → Project owner’s project manager 7.07 1.07
4 Project owner → Contractor 6.79 0.97
5 Contractor → Project owner 6.71 0.99
6 Project owner’s project manager → Project owner 6.61 1.18
7 Contractor → Contractor’s project manager 6.57 1.16
8 Contractor’s project manager → Contractor 6.36 1.15
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rank correlation test (Siegel, Castellan 1988). The ordered 
relationships between participating experts in Delphi 
rounds one and two were correlated. Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient rho = 0.905 was calculated. A val-
ue so high indicates a strong interdependence of results 
achieved in the first and second Delphi round. In conclu-
sion, the third Delphi round would be unlikely to change 
the rankings of the relationships between the respondents, 
as well as Kendall’s coefficient of concordance. Therefore 
the third Delphi round was considered unnecessary.
As can be seen by comparing the results of the ex-
ploratory survey and two Delphi rounds as presented 
in Tables 1–3, the importance of the project owner’s 
and contractor’s project managers grows in importance 
through the Delphi process. This can be seen through the 
growing mean values of the scores. Also, the consensus 
between the respondents grows through the process, as 
can be seen from the decreasing standard deviations in the 
scores. It is important to note that the two project manag-
ers exchange their places twice over the rounds, which 
demonstrates that monitoring is a two-way process. The 
two project managers as agents of the principal and the 
main agent – that is, the project owner and contractor – 
dominate the construction process in terms of importance. 
However, there is no contract between these two 
agents. As construction is a crucial stage of any pro-
ject, this finding requires careful scrutiny in terms of the 
importance of agents in the principal-agent theoretical 
framework. In the case of construction, further theoreti-
cal development is needed to better understand the best 
approach to risk minimization in the monitoring process.
6. Limitations
The Delphi method is an appropriate tool for investiga-
tion of project managers’ perceptions. According to Brauers 
(2003) there are two developments of Delphi method: one 
is based on meeting, and the other on questionnaires. The 
organization of a meeting produces quicker results. How-
ever, the meeting has to be organized in such a way that 
communication between the panel members is impossi-
ble. Nowadays teleconferences could be used to overcome 
geographical limitation of the experts. In this study the 
questionnaires were used for the application of the Delphi 
method. One of the limitations of this study is that the num-
ber of experts has decreased over time. In the first round, 
15 out of 20 selected respondents participated (response 
rate: 75 percent). In the second and final Delphi round, 11 
out of 15 respondents took part (response rate: 73 percent). 
Therefore, the tool can be used to provide a focus for fur-
ther research rather than to arrive at definite results.
Conclusions
The research presented here offers new challenges for the 
principal-agent theory. In construction, the project owner 
is the principal and contractor is the agent. However, both 
of them have their own agents. The two project managers 
play key roles in the construction phase of every major 
project, when both the project owner and contractor play 
subsidiary roles on account of project complexity and 
duration. This is when project managers, although agents, 
play key roles in construction projects.
Although project managers may act cooperatively 
with their principals, they may also act opportunistically, 
as the principal-agent theory points out. Therefore, the 
theoretical framework needs to be extended to encom-
pass the interaction between the key agents involved in 
construction projects, especially when there are no con-
tracts between the agents. A better understanding of that 
interaction is likely to be of value to other fields in which 
project managers play key roles in the execution of com-
plex projects.
The intricacies of the monitoring process, which is 
at the focus of the research presented here, will require 
much more detailed investigation of project managers 
and their interaction to arrive at the most promising in-
terplay between formal and informal communication dur-
ing construction. For instance, communication protocols 
defined in contracts may help improve the monitoring 
process. Such an investigation could be best achieved by 
means of interviews and/or focus groups. Many pointers 
for further study can be found in the above section out-
lining the respondents’ perceptions. They offer a useful 
guidance for further research.
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Communication risks in construction projects – introduction
This research concerns the relationship between the project owner, contractor, and their project managers (Fig. 2). 
These four parties are crucial to the success of every project. This research focuses on risks associated with their 
communication. The focus here is on information asymmetry in the project-management process. An example of in-
formation asymmetry is when one party does not fully know what the other knows or does.
This survey follows upon the exploratory survey. Twenty practitioners of project management have been selected 
for the two rounds. Both in terms of years of experience and of project size managed, they can be considered experts 
in the field.
The exploratory survey concerned the relationships between pairs of four key project participants. It focused on 
the relationships in the upper part of the diagram above. The relative importance of these pairs in risk minimization 
after the contract is signed is shown in the table below. In particular, the relationship between the two project manag-
ers was considered by the respondents to the previous survey to be most important for risk minimization. The results 
shown in the table below are those for the twenty practitioners of project management selected for further research.
Note that the means represent the level of importance on the scale from 1 to 9 (where 9 is “most important”). 
Also note that all standard deviations between the twenty respondents selected for further research were quite low and 
uniform across the four pairs. That means that there was little disagreement between the respondents.
SURVEY QUESTIONS
A. General information
Note that personal information will remain private.
Name:
B. Risk minimization – Relative importance of relationships between project parties
In this round of the research all relationships between the four key parties to a project are considered. These are shown 
on both upper and lower sides of the diagram above. This involves all relationships between all parties involved.
Note that information asymmetry changes once the contracts between different parties involved in a project are 
signed. Only three contracts are involved in the process. These are contracts between the project owner and contractor, 
as well as contracts between them and their project managers. Also note that only eight relationships are considered 
here. They are shown in the diagram above by eight arrows. Self-interest is also not considered here. The relationships 
which are not considered are to be left blank in the boxes of the table below.
Please use the scale from 1 to 9 (where 9 is “most important”) to rate the importance of each relationship between 
project parties in terms of communication risk involved:
Appendix A 
First Delphi Round
Survey question/Relationship PO → C PO → PMpo C → PMc PMpo → PMc
Gathering information after 
contract is signed between 
parties
Mean 7.30 6.90 6.74 7.70
St. Dev. 1.63 1.65 1.66 1.66
From (row) → To (column) PO PMpo PMc C
PO Leave blank Leave blank
PMpo Leave blank Leave blank
PMc Leave blank Leave blank
C Leave blank Leave blank
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Communication risks in construction projects — introduction
The aim of this survey is to reach a consensus between project-management experts on the most important relationships be-
tween the key project parties in terms of risk minimization in the construction phase of the project, after the contract is signed.
The results of the previous Delphi round are shown in the table below. This is the state of consensus at present stage. 
Both means or averages and standard deviations are shown, where standard deviations show mean or average deviations from 
means. The smaller they are, the greater the agreement.
SURVEY QUESTIONS
A. General information
Note that personal information will remain private.
Name:
B. Risk minimization – Relative importance of relationships between project parties
Having seen the results of the previous round, or the consensus between experts at present stage, you may wish to reconsider 
your previous responses. But this is by no means required. However, if you do wish to modify your previous responses, use 
the table below.
Please use the scale from 1 to 9 (where 9 is “most important”) to rate the importance of each relationship between pro-
ject parties in terms of communication risk involved:
C. Communication risk minimization
Please list specific communication risks between the project parties that you consider most important for project success after 
the contract is signed. If possible, also list most appropriate risk-minimization approaches in each case.
Project owner → Contractor:
Contractor → Project owner:
Project owner → Project owner’s project manager:
Project owner’s project manager → Project owner:
Contractor → Contractor’s project manager:
Contractor’s project manager → Contractor:
 Project owner’s project manager → Contractor’s project manager:
 Contractor’s project manager → Project owner’s project manager.
Appendix B 
Second Delphi Round





















From (row) → To (column) PO PMpo PMc C
PO Leave blank Leave blank
PMpo Leave blank Leave blank
PMc Leave blank Leave blank
C Leave blank Leave blank
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